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Abstract
This paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during
the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or
policy proposals coming from diﬀerent sources. We argue that this
potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains
after being elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the
incumbent. We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing
reelection and we characterize the conditions under which the advan-
tages that the incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages.
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1 Introduction
The incumbency advantage is a well documented phenomenon, according to
which an incumbent politician is more likely to be reelected than a chal-
lenger candidate. Empirical studies, such as Gelman and King (1990) and
Lee (2008), estimate the probability of success of an incumbent when facing
reelection in the US House. Their results provide strong evidence in favor of
the existence of an incumbency advantage. Other studies have analyzed the
specific reasons for this advantage. They typically assume that incumbents
have better ways to influence voters’ decisions than challengers, and that
they can do so through diﬀerent mechanisms such as redistricting (Levitt
and Wolfram 1997, Cox and Katz 2002), seniority (McKelvey and Reizman
1992), informational advantages (Krehbiel and Wright 1983), access to cam-
paign resources (Goodliﬀe 2001, Jacobson 2001), legislative irresponsibility
(Fiorina 1989) or pork barrel politics (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987, An-
solabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2000).
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) measured the incumbency advantage in
all state executives and found similar empirical support for the incumbent
advantage. However, they argue that this advantage does not have its origin
in the strategic choices made by incumbents but in their innate character-
istics. In this line, Bevia and Llavador (2009) show that only good quality
incumbents may enjoy an advantage and Asworth and de Mesquita (2008)
show that on average incumbents’ quality and ability are higher than the chal-
lengers’. Gowrisankaran, Mitchell and Moro (2006) find that incumbents face
weaker challengers than candidates that face open seats and Stone, Maisel
and Maestas (2004) find that incumbents’ personal qualities deter strong
challengers from running for oﬃce.
The present paper provides an explanation to the phenomenon of incum-
bency advantage that focuses on a mechanism that can potentially constrain
elected politicians. After winning an election the incumbent is supposed to
decide and implement some policies. These choices may turn out to be costly
in terms of probability of reelection. Hence, the incumbent might be facing
some restrictions on the policies that he can optimally implement if he wants
to stay in oﬃce one more term. In this paper, we show how these disadvan-
tages may be overcome by the advantages, and we also derive the conditions
under which this may not be the case.
We have in mind a specific type of issues and policy choices as the origin
of this incumbency disadvantage: The outcomes of diﬀerent forms of citi-
zen direct political participation. The outcomes of processes like referenda,
citizens’ initiatives or popular assemblies can constraint incumbents because
the policy they will finally implement on these issues will factor into the vot-
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ers’ evaluation of the incumbent’s performance. The challenger may have a
greater chance of winning in theses cases unless the incumbent is ready to
compromise. Our claim is that an incumbent facing this kind of situations
has an initial disadvantage compared, not only to an incumbent who does not
receive any proposal or does not have to call a referenda, but also compared
to the challenger. The challenger is not required to react to the outcome of
any of these processes of participation. In fact, the position of the challenger
does not allow him to do anything with respect to it. Given this, it is to
be expected that the incumbent’s potential disadvantage will be larger the
more policy motivated the incumbent is.
In order to perform the analysis of the incumbent’s decision we build a
formal model of electoral competition with two candidates, two issues and
three stages. In the first stage of the game, the incumbent faces an exoge-
nously given policy proposal on an issue, the popular issue, on which he has to
make a policy choice. The implementation of a policy choice on the popular
issue takes place during the legislature and before the beginning of the elec-
toral campaign. In the second stage of the game, both candidates announce
simultaneously their policy platforms on a diﬀerent issue, the electoral issue.
The electoral issue is defined in the same way as in most models of electoral
competition; the candidates’ choices in this issue represent their campaign
promises. Finally, in the third stage of the game, voters vote for their most
preferred candidate.
The model presented includes two diﬀerent types of asymmetries. First,
voters evaluate diﬀerent candidates in diﬀerent ways. We assume that voters
use all the information they have available in order to decide to whom to give
their vote. Thus when evaluating the incumbent, in addition to considering
his campaign promises, they have to take into account his choice on the
popular issue during the legislature. This information is not available for
the challenger given that he was not in oﬃce when the policy proposal was
announced.
The second asymmetry relates to how the two issues are treated. Citizens’
will evaluate the incumbent performance on the popular issue by comparing
his policy choice with the proposal they made to him. And they will evaluate
candidates on the electoral issue by comparing their own preferred policy
with each candidate’s political platform. Moreover, they will assign diﬀerent
weights to the incumbent’s choices on each one of the issues. Since only
the incumbent is evaluated on the popular issue, the weight that citizens
attribute to the electoral issue constitutes a measure of the degree of political
competition between the two candidates.
Since the decisions on the two dimensions of the model are made sequen-
tially, one at each stage, we can solve it as a one dimensional model within
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each stage. However, given the asymmetry implied by the decisions on the
popular issue made in the first stage, the standard median voter analysis
does not apply at the second stage. Indeed, in some cases we may obtain
that voters with ideal points at the two extremes of the distribution decide
to vote for the incumbent or for the challenger. This kind of situations does
not arise in equilibrium, but it needs to be considered for the equilibrium
analysis.
The optimal policy choices of the incumbent in both issues reflect the
incumbent’s trade-oﬀ between his own policy preferences and his benefit from
being re-elected. For all parameter values the incumbent has a strategy that
allows him to be reelected. The question is whether this winning strategy is
always optimal from the incumbent’s point of view. And the answer is no.
There are some instances where the incumbent prefers to forgo reelection
and guarantee to himself a good payoﬀ in terms of policies. For this to
happen we need three conditions to be satisfied: (1) the incumbent must
care enough about policy (that is, the value he obtains from holding oﬃce
must be low enough); (2) there must exist an intense enough conflict of
interests between the voters and the incumbent regarding the popular issue;
and (3) there is a very strong electoral competition on the electoral issue.
Under these circumstances, the policy implemented by the incumbent on
the popular issue coincides with his ideal point, that is, the incumbent does
not bear any utility cost from the policy implemented on the popular issue;
and the winning policy in the electoral competition stage is close to the
median voter’s ideal point. The intuition for this result is as follows: the
incumbent has a disadvantage coming from the popular issue whenever he
does not satisfy the voters’ demand on that issue. And he will enjoy the
largest advantage at the electoral competition stage when he fully satisfies
them. However, this is a costly strategy for a policy motivated candidate. If
the incumbent is policy motivated he will choose the winning strategy that
is cheapest in terms of policy from his view point. And when this strategy is
too costly, either because the conflict of interests with voters in the popular
issue is intense or because competition with the challenger is very strong in
the electoral issue, he will decide to give up on reelection.
Otherwise, in equilibrium the incumbent chooses a winning strategy that
consists of a combination of policies that depend on the weight that voters
assign to his performance on each issue. In this case, we study the incentives
of the incumbent to implement policies that are close to the voters’ demands.
The larger the weight that the voters assign to the electoral issue, the more
the incumbent will satisfy the voters on the electoral issue. However, this is
not the case for the popular issue. The incumbent fully satisfies the voters’
demands only for intermediate levels of the weight that they assign to that
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issue. This is because the incumbent does not compete with the challenger in
the popular issue. Hence, when citizens care a lot about it, the incumbent can
implement a policy closer to his ideal one in this issue without jeopardizing
his reelection; this cannot happen in the electoral issue where the incumbent
has to compete against the challenger candidate.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
discuss two real political mechanisms the analysis outlined above can apply
to, namely referenda and participatory democracy. Section 3 describes the
formal model. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 discuss them in
the light of the mechanisms mentioned above. The last section of the paper
oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Two sources of incumbency disadvantage
Many models of elections assume that after an election takes place, the in-
cumbent can choose to implement any policy that he likes. His policy choice
will depend only on his objective function. Then, if the incumbent is mostly
policy oriented he will tend to choose a policy close to his ideal point. But
in real life this is not always the case. When an incumbent is deciding which
policies to implement, he has to take into account that some policy choices
might have a large negative eﬀect on his chances of reelection. Citizens will
factor in these choices into their evaluation of the incumbent’s performance.
Notice that jeopardizing his reelection is not optimal for the incumbent even
when he cares about policy because the policy implemented in case he loses
will be worse from his point of view than the policy that he could have chosen
if he had won the election. Then, when incumbents have policy preferences,
they will have to compromise on some dimension if they want to be reelected.
In this paper we will refer to two diﬀerent types mechanism that can
generate incumbency disadvantage: referenda and participatory democracy.
There are some empirical studies that have shown that these mechanisms
of direct democracy are very eﬀective in satisfying voters preferences, and
overall increasing the voters wellbeing1. The characteristics that both refer-
enda and participatory democracy have in common are: (1) there is an issue
that is considered very important for a significant part of the population; (2)
there is a policy proposal received by the incumbent on this issue; (3) the
incumbent has to make a decision regarding that issue: either he implements
a particular policy or does not implement any policy on that issue; (4) there
is a significant proportion of voters that may base their voting decision on
1See Frey (1994), Frey and Bohnet (1993) and Frey and Slutzer (2000).
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that issue2. Next, we will elaborate more on how these mechanisms fit in our
main argument.
2.1 Referenda and popular initiatives
Referenda may be mandatory or facultative. They are mandatory if the law
(usually the constitution) directs authorities to hold referenda on specific
matters. This is normally the case for amending constitutions, impeaching
heads of state, ratifying international treaties, etc. Otherwise, when they are
facultative, they may be initiated at the will of a public authority or at the
will of some organized group of citizens (in this case it is also known as a
popular initiative). By the nature of their eﬀects, referenda may be either
binding or non-binding. A non-binding referendum is merely consultative or
advisory. It is left to the government or legislature to interpret its results
and they may even choose to ignore them. A binding referendum forces the
incumbent to implement its policy outcome. It may also require the support
of a supermajority of votes cast or a minimum turn-out of the electorate
(Herrera and Mattozzi, 2010).
If a non-binding referendum of any of these types is called during the time
of the legislature, the incumbent will have to react to it with a given policy
implementation or by choosing to ignore it. If he chooses not to implement
the policy corresponding to the referendum outcome he may be punished by
the voters. The relevance of this policy choice on the voters’ when deciding
whether to re-elect the incumbent will depend on the proportion of voters to
whom this issue is relevant.
A referendum initiated by the incumbent himself might have a weaker
eﬀect on the voters’ reaction than a referendum that originates with a popular
initiative. The first type of referendum requires a more complicated strategy
from the incumbent because he has to decide whether and when it is optimal
to call it. The analysis of these strategies is beyond the scope of this paper3.
2Of course, the policy proposal that comes out of any popular initiatives will not
represent a decision problem for the incumbent in systems where the proposals received
are considered as binding. In those instances the incumbent does not have a choice.
He must implement the proposed policy. This policy implementation might harm the
incumbent’s payoﬀs, but he will not be facing the kind of problem that we aim to analyze
here.
3See Xefteris (2008) for an analysis of the incumbent’s decision about when to call a
referendum.
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2.2 Participatory democracy
Some proposals received by the incumbent that have their origin in an orga-
nized group of citizens do not need to induce a referendum. This is the case
in systems of participatory democracy, an extended version of the system
of representative democracy, that allows citizens to make policy proposals
through popular assemblies. A real case of participatory democracy can be
found in the town meetings of New England, a form of local government
practiced since colonial times. It can also be found in the village governance
system in the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal and in the partic-
ipatory budgeting system of many Latin-American cities. It has also been
applied to school, university, and public housing budgets. The implications
of a participatory democracy system on the behavior of citizens and politi-
cians and on policy outcomes are analyzed in Aragones and Sánchez-Pagés
(2009).
In all these cases, popular assemblies emerge as a governance mechanism
because citizens, or at least a group of them, are interested on a certain issue,
normally a local one, and they would like certain policies being implemented.
These policies are decided through deliberation and discussions in meetings
and assemblies. Because they care enough about these issues, their expected
benefits from participating in the process may overcome the costs of coordi-
nating and then a policy proposal will emerge from these process and sent
to the incumbent. As a matter of fact, citizens’ participation in these real
experiences is substantial4. The incumbent in turn has formally complete
discretion regarding the policies he can implement. However, because the
support to these policy proposals is significant within the population, the
incumbent’s chances of being re-elected will partially depend on his policy
choice on that issue.
3 The model
We assume that electoral competition takes place across two dimensions,
denoted by x and y. Each dimension is represented by a unit interval of the
real line [0, 1]. Dimension x represents the electoral issue and dimension y
represents the popular issue. There are two candidates: the incumbent and
the challenger. The game proceeds in three stages. The first stage takes
place during the legislature: the incumbent receives a policy proposal on the
popular issue and given that, he has to implement a policy on that issue.
4In Porto Alegre, a Brazilian city of 2 million inhabitants, around 15% of the population
participates in the annual process of participatory budgeting.
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Both the policy proposed to the incumbent and the policy implemented by
him on the popular issue are common knowledge for all candidates and all
voters. The second stage is the electoral campaign: both candidates make
policy announcements simultaneously on the electoral issue. Again all policy
announcements are common knowledge by all candidates and all voters. It is
assumed that the winner will implement the announced policy on that issue.
In the third stage of the game the election takes place: voters decide whether
to reelect the incumbent or vote for the challenger. The winner is selected by
majority rule and implements the policy announced on the electoral issue.
3.1 Candidates
The two candidates are denoted by L and R. Candidate L is assumed to be
the incumbent. Candidates have single peaked preferences over the electoral
issue. Without any loss of generality we assume that on the electoral issue
the ideal point of candidate L is represented by xL = 0 and the ideal point
of candidate R is represented by xR = 1. We assume that the incumbent
has single-peaked preferences over the popular issue that are independent
of his preferences on the electoral issue. We assume that the incumbent’s
ideal point on the popular issue is represented by yL = 0. Given the features
of the game we analyze, it is not necessary to specify the properties of the
preferences on the popular issue for the challenger.
Let us denote by y(L) the policy chosen by the incumbent on this is-
sue during the legislature. The choice of the incumbent over the popular
issue is made and implemented during the legislature. Thus at the time of
the electoral campaign this choice has already been made and it is taken as
given. At the end of the legislature, elections take place and we assume that
they are represented by a standard model of electoral competition on the
electoral issue: the incumbent and the challenger simultaneously announce
policy platforms on the electoral issue, represented by x(L) and x(R) respec-
tively. We assume full commitment, that is, the winner of the election will
implement the policy he announced during the campaign on the electoral
issue.
We assume that candidates have preferences over policies but they are also
oﬃce-motivated. Candidates’ payoﬀs are represented by the following utility
functions that depend on the policy choice by the incumbent on the popular
issue and the policy announcements of both candidates on the electoral issue:
VL (y (L) , x (L) , x(R)) = − |yL − y (L)|+ πL (K − |xL − x (L)|)− (1− πL) |xL − x (R)|
VR (y(L), x(L), x (R)) = (1− πL) (K − |xR − x (R)|)− πL (|xR − x (L)|)
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where πL = πL(y(L), x(L), x(R)) represents the probability that candidate
L wins the election, and 1 − πL denotes the probability that candidate R
wins the election. The probability with which the incumbent is reelected
depends on the policy choices made during the legislature and the policy
announcements made during the campaign.
K is assumed to be a non-negative number that represents the utility of
holding oﬃce. K = 0 implies that candidates do not obtain any extra utility
from holding oﬃce, they only derive utility from the policy implemented. In
this case we would have two candidates that are only policy motivated. On
the other hand, the larger the value of K the more candidates value being
in oﬃce. Thus for larger values of K candidates care more about winning
than about the policies they need to implement or commit to in order to win.
By increasing the value of K we obtain that candidates become purely oﬃce
motivated.
There is an asymmetry embedded in the definition of the candidates’
payoﬀ functions. The incumbent obtains a negative payoﬀ whenever he im-
plements a policy on the popular issue that does not coincide with his ideal
point on this issue. While the challenger’s payoﬀs are not aﬀected by the
incumbent’s policy choice on the popular issue. This assumption is justified
because the challenger cannot do anything with respect to the policy imple-
mentation on the popular issue, since this takes place during the legislature
when he does not have any implementation power. Therefore, he does not
have to suﬀer any cost from that policy choice.
For simplicity, we have assumed that the incumbent cares equally about
the two issues. Introducing a parameter in the incumbent’s payoﬀ function
that represents the relative weight that each issue has on the incumbent
overall payoﬀs would not change the main qualitative results obtained.
3.2 Voters
There is an infinite number of voters. Voters have single-peaked preferences
over the electoral issue x. We assume that their ideal points are uniformly
distributed over this issue x, thus the ideal point of the median voter on
the electoral issue is xm = 12 . We do not model the voters’ preferences on
the popular issue y. Let the ideal point of society in issue y be denoted by
ym > 0. The parameter ym is considered exogenous in our model. It is to
be interpreted as the outcome of a referendum or a process of participatory
democracy. As a simplifying assumption we consider that it represents the
will of all citizens, and therefore it has the support of all the constituency.
Notice that since the ideal point of the incumbent on the popular issue
is assumed to be yL = 0, the value of ym measures the magnitude of the
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conflict of interest between the incumbent and the citizens with respect to
the popular issue.
When facing the election, voters observe the policies announced by both
candidates on the electoral issue, x(L) and x(R), take into account the pol-
icy implemented by the incumbent on the popular issue, y(L), and decide
whether to reelect the incumbent. Voters use all the information available
in order to evaluate the two candidates. Since they have diﬀerent kinds of
information about each candidate, their decision rule must exhibit some sort
of asymmetry.
We assume that voter i evaluates the incumbent according to the following
function:
Ui (L) = − (1− μ) |ym − y (L)|− μ |xi − x (L)| .
where μ is a parameter that measures the relative weight that voters assign
to the electoral issue with respect to the popular issue. We assume that
0 ≤ μ ≤ 1. The parameter μ thus measures the importance of the electoral
issue over the popular issue. Values of μ close to one are to be interpreted as if
the society considers that the popular issue is not very important, thus their
payoﬀs would not be much aﬀected by the incumbent’s policy choice on that
issue. Values of μ close to zero mean that the popular issue is regarded as
very important from the voters’ point of view and their payoﬀs will be largely
aﬀected by the incumbent’s policy choice. Observe that voters evaluate the
policy implemented on the popular issue comparing it to the policy proposed
initially, and they evaluate the electoral issue comparing it to their own ideal
point.
The challenger’s performance on the popular issue cannot be evaluated,
since he has not been able to do anything on that issue during the present
legislature. Thus voters can only evaluate the challenger according to his pol-
icy promises on the electoral issue. The reader may argue that the challenger
could also make promises on the popular issue that would be implemented in
case he wins the election. We are assuming here that the popular issue refers
to one-oﬀ issues or to issues on which the incumbent policy choices are im-
possible or too costly to reverse, like an annual budget, abortion legislation,
participation in a war or signing an international treaty. Formally, voter i
evaluates the challenger according to the following function:
Ui (R) = − |xi − x (R)| .
Therefore, voter i will vote for candidate L if and only if
− (1− μ) |ym − y (L)|− μ |xi − x (L)| ≥ − |xi − x (R)| . (1)
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The lower the value of μ the more weight past choices have on the eval-
uation of the incumbent. That in turn will aﬀect electoral competition, to
the extent that a citizen with ideal point xi = x(L) will vote for candidate
R whenever
μ ≤ 1− |xi − x (R)||ym − y (L)| .
This shows that the existence of a policy proposed on the popular issue
imposes a severe constraint on the incumbent’s choices. If the distance be-
tween the incumbent’s choice and the citizens’ ideal point on the popular
issue is large enough, it may be the case that the set of voters that decide to
vote for the incumbent becomes non-connected.
Given this rule, the incumbent is reelected if an only if the set of vot-
ers that prefer the incumbent to the challenger contains a majority of the
population. We assume that if there is a tie the incumbent is reelected.
This specification encompasses as particular cases some standard models
of two-party competition. If μ = 1, that is, voters care only about the
electoral issue, we have a standard model of electoral competition. In this
case, for very large values of K candidates are purely opportunistic and the
model describes a downsian framework. Instead, for relatively small values of
K, candidates behave as mostly policy motivated, and our model reproduces
Wittman (1983) model of electoral competition. On the other hand, the
case of μ = 0 boils down to a more general version of our previous work on
participatory democracy (Aragonès and Sánchez-Pagés, 2009).
Thus, we have set up a game in three stages: First, the incumbent im-
plements a policy on the popular dimension. In the second stage, both can-
didates simultaneously announce policy platforms and in the third stage cit-
izens vote to reelect or not the incumbent. In the next section we analyze
the equilibrium of this game for all values of the parameters K, μ and ym.
4 Equilibrium results
In order to solve the game described above we look for its subgame perfect
equilibrium, solving the game by backward induction. Thus we start analyz-
ing the electoral stage, taking as given the choice of the incumbent on the
popular issue.
Citizens evaluate the incumbent according to his performance on the pop-
ular issue, so he does not enter the new election on the same grounds as the
challenger. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the incumbent is
indeed at a disadvantage. When the incumbent expects to face a tough com-
petition on the electoral issue, he can soften it by conceding more on the
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popular issue. Similarly, when the incumbent expects to face a soft competi-
tion on the electoral issue, he can compensate his payoﬀs by not satisfying the
voters on the popular issue. This is a strategic move that only the incumbent
may aﬀord. The following lemma illustrates this point.
Lemma 1 If x (L) = x (R) , then L obtains at least 1− 2 |y (L)− ym| of the
votes and R obtains at most 2 |y (L)− ym| .
All proofs can be found in the appendix. This lemma shows how the
presence of the popular issue aﬀects the electoral competition. When both
candidates choose the same position on the electoral issue, that is when
x (L) = x (R) , only citizens at a distance of at least |y (L)− ym| from the
policy proposed by both candidates vote for the incumbent. Thus, it is pos-
sible that the vote of the extremists is captured by the incumbent given a
a specific performance on the popular issue. It also implies that the incum-
bent’ chances of winning are higher if he does not depart too much from the
society’s most preferred policy on the popular issue. As a matter of fact, the
threshold on this distance is critical in ascertaining whether the incumbent
has an advantage. The next proposition describes the policy choices on the
popular issue that guarantee the incumbent reelection in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If |y (L)− ym| < 1/4, then L wins in equilibrium.
When the incumbent decides to satisfy the citizens with his policy choice
on the popular issue, the advantage that he obtains guarantees the existence
of a wining strategy at the electoral stage. If the policy choice of the popular
issue is close enough to the policy proposal, then it is also optimal for the
incumbent to use the strategy that guarantees a sure reelection. That is what
he will do in equilibrium.
On the other hand, if the incumbent does not satisfy the electorate with
his performance on the participatory issue he will suﬀer a disadvantage at
the electoral stage. In this case the incumbent cannot always guarantee a
wining strategy at the electoral stage, and even when he can use a wining
strategy, he prefers to lose in equilibrium. This is what the next proposition
shows.
Proposition 3 If |y (L)− ym| > 1/4, R wins in equilibrium.
12
The two previous propositions show that the incumbent obtains a decisive
advantage only when she concedes enough to citizens on the popular issue.
If, on the contrary, she departs considerably from ym then she is doomed
to lose reelection. In order to solve the problem of the incumbent when
choosing what policy to implement on the popular issue, we need to fully
characterize the equilibrium of the political competition stage. The following
two propositions describe the equilibrium strategies used by the winner of
the election in equilibrium. These strategies define the equilibrium policy
outcome of the electoral stage as well. First we find the equilibrium outcomes
of the electoral stage for the case in which the incumbent is reelected in
equilibrium. In this case, the equilibrium policy outcome coincides with the
strategies used by the incumbent in equilibrium at the electoral stage.
Proposition 4 If |y (L)− ym| ≤ 14 , then L’s equilibrium strategies at the
electoral stage are:
i) x∗(L) = 0 if |y (L)− ym| ≤ 1−3μ4(1−μ)
ii) x∗(L) = 3μ−1
4μ +
1−μ
μ |y (L)− ym| if |y (L)− ym| ≥ 1−3μ4(1−μ)
This proposition illustrates the type of trade-oﬀ the incumbent faces when
he tries to win the election. The more he pleases the electorate on the
popular issue, the more able he will be to implement his preferred policy
in the electoral issue. In particular, the incumbent is able to guarantee his
reelection by implementing his ideal point on the electoral issue if he satisfies
voters enough on the popular issue. In order to be able to be reelected by
proposing his ideal point on the electoral issue the incumbent will have to
concede more on the popular issue the larger the value of μ since 1−3μ
4(1−μ)
decreases with μ.
Otherwise, if he implements a policy on the popular issue that departs
significantly from the policy proposal, then in equilibrium he still wins but
in this case his equilibrium strategy implies that he has to compromise on
the electoral issue to some extent. In this latest case, in order to guarantee a
sure reelection the policy in the electoral issue that he has to announce will
lie between his ideal point and the median voter’s ideal point, and it will be
closer to the median voter’s ideal point the larger the distance between the
policy implemented by the incumbent and the policy proposed on the popular
issue. This equilibrium policy choice will also be closer to the median voter’s
ideal point the tougher the competition at the electoral stage, that is the
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larger the value of μ5 . In the limit, as the competition at the electoral
stage intensifies, i.e. μ increases, the policy announced by the incumbent on
the electoral issue approaches the median voter’s ideal point. Similarly, as the
popular issue becomes more important, i.e. μ decreases, the policy announced
by the incumbent on the electoral issue approaches the incumbent’s ideal
point.
The next proposition describes the equilibrium outcome of the electoral
stage for the case in which the incumbent decides to forgo reelection in equi-
librium. In this case the equilibrium policy outcome coincides with the strate-
gies used by the challenger at the electoral stage in equilibrium.
Proposition 5 If |y (L)− ym| > 14 , then R’s equilibrium strategy at the elec-
toral stage is x∗(R) = 1
2
+ 1−μ
1+μ |y (L)− ym| .
When the incumbent has departed significantly from the citizens’ ideal
point in the popular issue, he prefers to lose the election and in the resulting
equilibrium the challenger chooses a moderate policy in order to win. Observe
that x∗(R) is decreasing in μ so, as before, the tougher the competition at
the electoral stage the closer the policy outcome will be to the median voter’s
ideal point. And the larger the distance between the policy proposal and the
policy implemented on the popular issue the closer the policy outcome on
the electoral issue will be from the challenger’s ideal point.
After solving for the equilibrium strategies of the electoral stage of the
game, we move backward in order to find the incumbent’s best responses for
the first stage of the game given the payoﬀs obtained from the continuation
of the game.
Proposition 6 L’s best wining strategies are:
(i) y∗(L) = max
n
ym − 1−3μ4(1−μ) , 0
o
and x∗(L) = 0 if μ ≤ 1
3
(ii) y∗(L) = ym and x∗(L) = 3μ−14μ if
1
3
≤ μ ≤ 1
2
(iii) y∗(L) = max
©
ym − 14 , 0
ª
and x∗(L) = 1
2
if μ ≥ 1
2
.
First, it is evident that as competition on the electoral issue becomes more
intense, i.e. μ increases, the incumbent needs to select a platform closer to
5Straightfoward calculations show that ∂x
∗(L)
∂μ =
1
μ2
¡
1
4 − |y (L)− ym|
¢
≥ 0.
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the median voter’s ideal policy. But more surprisingly, there exists a non-
monotonicity on the gap between the policy she implements in the participa-
tory issue and the proposal of the assembly. When the participatory issue is
important (low μ) the incumbent is virtually facing no opposition. Actually,
when competition on the electoral issue is rather soft (μ ≤ 1
3
) the incumbent
can win by implementing her most preferred policy on the electoral issue. As
competition on the electoral issue becomes tougher, the concession on the
participatory issue needed to achieve his reelection increases.
As μ becomes larger the incumbent faces a new decision. He can either
please the citizens on the popular issue by implementing their proposed policy
ym and in return choose a policy close to her ideal one on the electoral one,
or alternatively he can go for the median voter on that dimension and select
a policy as close as possible to his own ideal policy on the popular issue. For
intermediate levels of μ the first option pays oﬀ because electoral competition
is still relatively soft so he can implement a policy relatively close to his ideal
one on the electoral issue. That winning electoral promise will be larger
(less favorable for the incumbent, but always smaller than 1
4
), the tougher
electoral competition becomes, that is, the larger the value of μ. However for
very tough electoral competition, i.e. μ > 1
2
, the incumbent will prefer the
second option and he will compromise substantially on the electoral issue,
that is, he has to implement the median voter´s ideal point. Figure 1 depicts
the incumbent´s winning strategy in both stages of the game as a function
of μ.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Next we find the incumbent’s best losing strategy and the corresponding
best response of the challenger.
Lemma 7 The incumbent best losing strategies are y∗(L) = 0 and x∗(L) =
1/2 which in turn implies that x∗(R) = 1
2
+ 1−μ
1+μym.
The last step of the analysis amounts to characterize when the incumbent
will prefer to win the election. The parameters that determine whether the
incumbent prefers to win the election are: the policy proposed on the popular
issue, ym, the incumbent’s value for holding oﬃce, K, and the relative weight
that voters assign to the diﬀerent issues, μ. In particular, we have that if the
policy proposed on the popular issue is close enough to the ideal point of
the incumbent on this issue, then the incumbent prefers to win for all values
of K and all values of μ. Otherwise, if the preferences of the incumbent on
the popular issue are not aligned with the policy proposal on this issue, then
the incumbent may decide to forgo the reelection. In this case, he will do so
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only when he is mostly policy motivated (for low values of K). The tougher
electoral competition is, the bigger is the range of values of K that induces
the incumbent to forgo the election. Intuitively, the more intense electoral
competition and the more costly is to please voters in the popular issue, the
more likely is that the incumbent will prefer to lose.
Proposition 8 The incumbent wins in equilibrium
(i) When ym ≤ 14 for any K ≥ 0 and any 0 ≤ μ ≤ 1.
(ii) When 1
4
≤ ym ≤ 38 if and only if K > max
n
2μ
1+μym −
1
4
, 0
o
(iii) When ym ≥ 38 if and only if
K >
(
max
n
2μ
1+μym +
5μ−3
4(1−μ) , 0
o
if μ ≤ 1
2
2μ
1+μym −
1
4
if μ ≥ 1
2
As we have proven before, when the preferences of the incumbent on the
popular issue are aligned with those of the society (ym ≤ 14) the incumbent
always prefers to use a winning strategy. When that is not the case we find
that for some combinations of values for K and μ the incumbent may prefer
to forgo reelection. That happens only for large enough values of μ, and for
small enough values of K. The area under the curves in Figure 2 correspond
to the area of the parameter space where the incumbent is not reelected in
equilibrium.
[Insert figure 2 about here]
Incumbents that are mostly policy motivated, i.e. have low values of
K, might suﬀer a disadvantage from being in oﬃce. They may find it too
costly to make a policy investment that would guarantee their reelection
when their preferences are not aligned with society’s preferences. The cost of
being reelected may also be too high when the degree of competition on the
electoral issue is high, i.e μ close to 1. In that case, the incumbent will have
to propose a very moderate policy on the electoral issue if he wants to beat
the challenger. Outside these cases, citizens’ proposals can be used by the
incumbent to provide him with a definitive advantage in political competition
and make him be reelected.
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5 Discussion
The success of representative democracy relies on the willingness of incum-
bents to deliver policies that satisfy the preferences of voters. The incentives
that such a system oﬀers to politicians often do not go in this direction. In-
cumbents that are policy motivated, as opposed to oﬃce motivated, do not
take into account voters’ preferences, and they often ignore them. Mecha-
nisms of direct democracy can create a bridge between candidates and voters
(1) by transmitting information about the voters’ preferences to candidates,
and (2) by oﬀering incentives to incumbents to satisfy citizens’ policy propos-
als. Our results show that these mechanisms will tend to create an incum-
bency advantage although incumbents will not be reelected if there exists a
substantial disalignment between them and the voters’ views. At the light of
these results, we will now revisit the two mechanisms of citizen participation
described in Section 2.
5.1 Referenda
There is empirical evidence showing that voters welfare increases when voters
make use of mechanisms of direct democracy. Econometric cross-section
studies for Switzerland reveal that policy choices regarding provision of public
goods correspond better with the voters’ preferences in those cantons where
mechanisms of political participation are more extensively developed. Public
expenditures are ceteris paribus lower in communities where the taxpayers
themselves can decide on such matters.
One could argue that the use of mechanisms of referenda to achieve this
is unnecessary because it is unlikely that the views of elected representatives
will be substantively diﬀerent from those of voters. However, empirical evi-
dence suggests on the contrary that disalignment between the incumbent and
the citizens is a likely scenario, especially in the case of local public services,
as shown by Agreen, Dahlberg and Mork (2006) for a sample of Swedish
municipalities. For the case of Switerzland, Frey and Bohnet (1993) report
that:
"In September 1992, the citizens of Switzerland turned down two
proposals seeking to increase substantially the salaries and the
staﬀ of Swiss members of Parliament. Both issues would have
become law without Swiss voters taking the optional referendum,
and both issues would clearly have been to the benefit of the
elected oﬃcials."
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In addition, the two referenda called in Switzerland to decide whether
the country should join the UN and the UE in 1986 and 1992 respectively
yielded a rejection of these proposals despite the strong backing of all major
political parties6. This is a more general trend. A 39% of the referenda held
in Switzerland between 1948 and 1990 yielded results that opposed the views
of the Parliament.
Referenda allow voters to destroy the agenda control of politicians and
bring implemented policies closer to what satisfies voters’ preferences. One
could think that if these direct democracy systems are so eﬀective in select-
ing policies, then lobbies would have strong incentives in manipulating them.
However, Frey and Bohnet (1993) argue that lobbying is less successful when
these systems of direct democracy are in place. They show that in Switzer-
land, even if pressure groups and the political class are united they cannot
always have their way particularly on important issues.
5.2 Participatory democracy
Real life experiences of participatory democracy have mainly materialized
in processes of "Participatory Budgeting" at the city level. This is the case
of nearly two hundred Brazilian municipalities where direct democracy, in
the form of popular assemblies, coexists with formal political parties and
local elections. The most famous experience of Participatory budgeting was
initiated in 1989 in the city of Porto Alegre after the Workers’ Party, leaded
by Inacio Lula da Silva, gained power. It was then extended to the state level
Rio Grande del Sul in 1998 but was abruptly terminated after the Workers’
Party lost the election of 2002.
After the first few years after the Participatory Budgeting system was
implemented, critics raised issues about the system being used as partisan
instrument by the Workers’ Party. As a matter of fact, the party had won
all municipal elections since 1989 by wide margins. The present paper ar-
gues that the incumbent party will enjoy an advantage if it satisfies voters’
preferences. Most studies argue that that was the case, as suggested by the
enhanced levels of income redistribution and the patterns of citizen partic-
ipation in the process (Aragones and Sanchez-Pages, 2009). However, the
system did not yield the reelection of the Workers’ Party candidate in the
2002 state level election. What was the diﬀerence between these two scenar-
ios?
6The referendum of Switzerland joining the United Nations resulted in a rejection by
76% of the voters. A 50% percent of the population voted against Switzerland becoming
part of the European Economic Area.
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As argued by Goldfrank and Schneider (2006), one key issue was the de-
gree of political competition. A the city level, the Workers’ Party held strong
support in Porto Alegre, and it is likely that the popular issue was dominant
in voters’ minds when casting their vote in subsequent elections. However,
at the state level, the Worker’s party faced a much stronger opposition from
the rest of parties. That would correspond in our model with a higher level
of μ. Our results would suggest that the scenario in which the incumbent
party does not enjoy an advantage would be much more likely to arise in
this case. Goldfrank and Schneider (2006) computed the diﬀerence between
promised investments and actual investments completed for each municipal-
ity under the Workers’ Party rule and then estimated a strong negative eﬀect
of these dashed expectations on the share of municipal votes of the party in
the 2002 election. That showed that the departure between actual policy
choices and proposals in an issue likely to correspond to the popular issue
in our model, severely undermined the advantage that he incumbent party
could have potentially enjoyed in these municipalities.
6 Concluding remarks
The contribution of this paper is to show how the incumbency advantage
coexists with an incumbency disadvantage. This is the case when the re-
action of the incumbent to the outcome of diﬀerent mechanisms of citizen
political participation factors into the citizens’ evaluation of the incumbent’s
performance.
We have characterized conditions under which the disadvantages gen-
erated by these mechanisms are compensated by the advantages and the
incumbent can still run as favorite in the electoral campaign. In all these
cases, the incumbent has to adjust his policy choices in order to accommo-
date the policy proposals he receives, and the final policy outcome is close
to the policy outcome most preferred by society. But this is not always the
case. When the policy demands made by society are too costly from the
incumbent’s point of view, the incumbent may decide to forgo reelection. In
this case the final policy outcome is bad from the voters’ point of view.
From the results of our analysis we conclude that policy proposals that are
not aligned with the policy preferences of the incumbent will have a negative
impact on the voters payoﬀs, and policy proposals that are aligned with the
policy preferences of the incumbent will have a positive impact on the voters
payoﬀs. Therefore, it is optimal for the voters to submit policy demands that
do not put too much pressure on the incumbent.
Notice that this analysis applies only to policy proposals that are sup-
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ported by a large enough proportion of the electorate and that are made on
issues relevant to a substantial part of the population. Under these condi-
tions, these proposals constitute a potential threat to the incumbent at the
voting stage. In general, policy proposals may be put forward by a an orga-
nized group of citizens, the government, a party in the opposition, a lobby,
etc. The results of polls and surveys on important issues like abortion, ter-
rorism, immigration or military intervention on foreign countries may also
be considered as sources of policy proposals. Each of these cases will have
diﬀerent consequences over the strategic behavior of all agents in the follow-
ing stages of the game and over the final outcomes. In particular, depending
on the origin of the proposal, the intensity of the voters response will be
diﬀerent and the balance between the incumbent’s incentives to react to it
will also change.
The elaboration and submission of a policy proposal through the call
of a referendum, a popular initiative or a citizens’ assembly is very costly
for voters in terms of time and eﬀort, in addition to the cost of coordinating
actions. Thus, it will only be optimal for a group of citizens to engage in such
a project when the expected benefits of it are large enough, that is, when the
expected change in the incumbent’s actions improves the voters’ final payoﬀ
enough to compensate the cost of the process. And this can only happen
on issues over which an important part of the society has strong preferences.
The eﬀect of the policy proposal on the voters’ final payoﬀs would be larger
if the incumbent’s policy preferences on the issue are weak (that is, no policy
implementation is expected on an issue that is regarded as very important
by the electorate), or when there is a clear conflict of preferences between
the incumbent and the society. In these cases it is reasonable to assume
that voters will invest time and eﬀort in elaborating a policy proposal to be
submitted to the incumbent on those issues for which the voters preferences
are very intense and the incumbents’ preferences are very weak. That is, if
they think that the incumbent is planning to make a more or less satisfactory
policy choice on a certain issue, voters will not go through the trouble of
organizing and making a proposal. On the other hand, if voters think that
the incumbent is not going to act on an issue that they regard as important
in a satisfactory way, then they will have incentives to submit a proposal and
use it as a threat.
A novel feature of our approach is that the model we build combines
elements of both retrospective voting and prospective voting. Voters use ret-
rospective voting to evaluate the performance of the incumbent with respect
to the popular issues. And voters use prospective voting to evaluate the
campaign promises that candidates announce during the electoral campaign.
In order to use all the information available to them at the time of voting,
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voters combine these two diﬀerent kinds of evaluations in a unique payoﬀ
function.
We have assumed that voters use an asymmetric rule in order to evaluate
the candidates. The reason is that we have identified two diﬀerent kinds of
asymmetries that we had to take into account: (1) only the incumbent is re-
sponsible for the policy implemented on the popular issue, and (2) there is a
policy proposal made only on the popular issue. Thus, we have assumed that
voters assign diﬀerent weights to the two issues, they evaluate the incumbent
according to his performance on the two issues and the challenger only ac-
cording to the electoral issue. We could relax this assumption by assuming
that both candidates are evaluated according to both issues. The evaluation
of the challenger with respect to the popular issue would just become an
exogenous parameter given that the challenger cannot implement any policy
during the legislature. This parameter would represent the performance of
the challenger on the popular issues in the past. We could also assume that
the weights that voters assign to the diﬀerent issues are diﬀerent depending
on the candidate that they are evaluating. In this case, we would have that
the incumbent is more likely to have an advantage the larger it is the weight
that the voters assign to the challenger on the electoral issue.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. If x (L) = x (R) then − (1− μ) |ym − y (L)| −
μ |xi − x (L)| ≥ − |xi − x (R)| becomes |ym − y (L)| ≤ |xi − x (R)|. Thus
L obtains votes from all i such that are at a distance from x(R) = x(L)
of at least |y (L)− ym|. This means that R obtains at most 2 |y (L)− ym|
votes, therefore L obtains at least 1 − 2 |y (L)− ym| votes. Notice that in
this case R obtains exactly 2 |y (L)− ym| if |y (L)− ym| ≤ x (L) = x (R) ≤
1− |y (L)− ym| .
Proof of Proposition 2. First suppose that {y (L) , x(L), x(R)} is an
equilibrium outcome such that x(R) = x(L). Then R cannot win because by
the previous lemma R at most can obtain 2 |y (L)− ym| < 1/2 votes.
Next suppose that {y (L) , x(L), x(R)} is an equilibrium outcome such
that x(R) 6= x(L) and R wins. Then we must have
UL (y(L), x(L), x(R)) = −y(L)− x(R).
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Consider that L chooses instead x0(L) = x(R). Then by the previous lemma
L obtains at least 1−2 |y (L)− ym| > 1/2 votes. Thus L wins and his utility
is
UL (y(L), x(R), x(R)) = −y(L) +K − x(R) > −y(L)− x(R),
In this case L prefers to win and has a winning strategy. Thus R cannot win
in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3. First suppose that |y (L)− ym| > 1/2. If
L is winning in equilibrium with x(L) and x(R), then consider x0(R) such
that x0(R) = x(L) and notice that in this case R obtains more than half of
the total vote. Thus R can win the election in this using this strategy, and
it is also optimal for R to do so since he obtains an extra payoﬀ of K and
his deviation does not involve any change in the policy implemented. The
reason is that if x(L) ≤ 1/2 then R obtains a vote share equal to x(L) +
min {1− x(L), |y (L)− ym|} which is a majority. Similarly if x(L) ≥ 1/2
then R obtains 1− x(L) +min {x(L), |y (L)− ym|} which is also a majority.
Thus L cannot win in equilibrium with |y (L)− ym| > 1/2.
Next suppose that |y (L)− ym| ∈ (14 , 12)
If x(L) ∈
£
1
2
− |y (L)− ym| , 12 + |y (L)− ym|
¤
then R can defeat it with
x(R) = x(L). In this case R obtains a vote share of 2 |y (L)− ym| > 1/2
which allows R to win. R prefers to do so since by mimicking L he obtains
an extra payoﬀ of K and his deviation does not involve any change in the
policy implemented..
If x(L) ≤ 1
2
− |y (L)− ym| then R can defeat L with x (R) ∈ (3−2μ4 , 34). To
show this, note that the set of supporters of R is the interval [x(R)+μx(L)
1+μ −
1−μ
1+μ |y (L)− ym| , 1] whenever x (R) > (1− μ)(1− |y (L)− ym|) + μx (L) . In
addition, this number of voters constitutes a majority if and only if x (R) <
1+μ
2
+ (1 − μ) |y (L)− ym| − μx (L) . This defines an interval of platforms
that R can use to defeat L. Given the restrictions on |y (L)− ym| and the
assumption on x(L), this interval is at least as large as the interval (3−2μ
4
, 3
4
).
Hence, any platform in this interval guarantees R a victory against x(L).Note
again that R prefers to win rather than to let L win because, in addition to
obtaining K, the policy outcome is closer to his ideal point.
If x(L) ≥ 1
2
+ |y (L)− ym| then the best winning policy for R is x(R) =
μx(L) + (1− μ)(1
2
+ |y (L)− ym|). We show this by following the same pro-
cedure as above to define the set of R’s supporters and then check when it
constitutes a majority. Next we need to see whether R actually uses this
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winning strategy. For this to be the case it need to hold that
K − 1 + μx(L) + (1− μ)(1
2
+ |y (L)− ym|) > −1 + x(L)
⇔ x(L) < K
1− μ +
1
2
+ |y (L)− ym| .
Hence, L will not able to win with a x(L) in (1
2
+ |y (L)− ym| , 1] if K >
(1− μ)(1
2
− |y (L)− ym|). If K < (1− μ)(12 − |y (L)− ym|) we need to check
whether L prefers to win the election with such rightist policy. The best case
scenario for L if he wants to win is when x(L) = K
1−μ +
1
2
+ |y (L)− ym| .
In that case, his payoﬀ is just −y(L) + K − K
1−μ −
1
2
− |y (L)− ym| . The
best case scenario for L if in the contrary he decides to lose is to set x(L) =
1
2
+|y (L)− ym| given that that forces R to choose the same policy. His payoﬀ
is just −y(L)− 1
2
− |y (L)− ym| , so he actually prefers to lose.
Proof of Proposition 4. From the previous proposition we know
that in this case L wins in equilibrium. Suppose that x(L) and x(R) is an
equilibrium outcome such that L wins and x(R) < x(L). Then we must have
UL (y(L), x(L), x(R)) = −y(L) +K − x(L). Consider that L chooses instead
x0(L) = x(R). Then by lemma 1 L obtains at least 1−2 |y (L)− y (A)| > 1/2
votes and his utility is UL (y(L), x(R), x(R)) = −y(L) +K − x(R).
Notice that UL (y(L), x(R), x(R)) = −y(L) +K − x(R) > −y(L) +K −
x(L) = UL (y(L), x(L), x(R)) since we assumed that x(R) < x(L). Thus,
x(L) and x(R) such that x(R) < x(L) cannot be part of an equilibrium
strategy and we must have x(L) ≤ x(R).
Let us first characterize the sets of voters that vote for candidate L given
y (L) , x(L) and x(R).
The set of voters with xi < x (L) that vote for L is given by all xi such
that
xi <
x (R)− μx (L)
1− μ − |y (L)− ym| ≡ xi.
Similarly, the set of voters with xi > x (R) that vote for L is given by all
xi such that
xi >
x (R)− μx (L)
1− μ + |y (L)− ym| ≡ xi
Since by proposition 2 x(R)−μx(L)
1−μ > x (R) then we have that xi > x (R).
Notice that if xi < 0 then xi < 1 for all |y (L)− ym| < 12 .
Finally, the set of voters with x (L) < xi < x (R) that vote for L is given
by all xi such that
xi <
x (R) + μx (L)
1 + μ
− 1− μ
1 + μ
|y (L)− ym| ≡ exi
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Since by proposition 2 x(R)+μx(L)
1+μ < x (R) then we have that exi < x (R) <
xi. However, the comparison between xi and exi is not clear-cut. We have
that xi < exi < x(L) if and only if
x(R)− x(L) < (1− μ) |y (L)− ym| .
Thus, two cases can emerge:
Case 1: If x(R)−x(L) ≥ (1−μ) |y (L)− ym| then we have that the votes
that L obtains are given by exi +max {0, 1− xi} .
Case 2: If x(R)−x(L) < (1−μ) |y (L)− ym| then we have that the votes
that L obtains are given by max
©
0, xi
ª
+max {0, 1− xi} .
Case 1: If x(R)− x(L) ≥ (1− μ) |y (L)− ym|
In this case we have that the votes that L obtains are given by exi +
max {0, 1− xi} .
Suppose in the first place that x(L) = 0. Then the number of votes that
L receives are
#L =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1− |y (L)− ym|− x(R)1−μ if x (R) < (1− μ) |y (L)− ym|
1− 2μ
1−μ2x(R)−
2
1+μ |y (L)− ym| if x (R) ∈ [(1− μ) |y (L)− ym| , (1− μ)(1− |y (L)− y
x(R)
1+μ −
1−μ
1+μ |y (L)− ym| if x (R) > (1− μ)(1− |y (L)− ym|)
that attains a minimum when x (R) = (1−μ)(1− |y (L)− ym| . The number
of votes in that case is greater than 1
2
if and only if
|y (L)− ym| ≤ 1− 3μ
4(1− μ) .
Note that if this holds, x(L) = 0 is a winning strategy for L. Otherwise,
there exists a platform x(R) that can defeat x(L) = 0.
Second, suppose that 1−3μ
4(1−μ) < |y (L)− ym| > 14 . Let us first show that any
platform x(L) ∈ (0, 3μ−1
4μ +
1−μ
μ |y (L)− ym|) can be defeated by x(R) = 3−μ4 .
First, note that we are in Case 1 since
x(R)− x(L) > (1− μ) |y (L)− ym|⇔ x(L) < 3− μ
4
− (1− μ) |y (L)− ym|
and in addition we have by assumption that
x(L) <
3μ− 1
4μ
+
1− μ
μ
|y (L)− y (A)| < 3− μ
4
− (1− μ) |y (L)− y (A)|
where the last inequality follows from simple algebra. One can also show
that our assumption on x(L) also implies that xi > 1 which means that the
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number of votes obtained by L is just exi which in turn is smaller than 12 if
and only if
x (L) <
3μ− 1
4μ
+
1− μ
μ
|y (L)− ym| ,
which holds by assumption. Hence, L is defeated if he chooses a platform
in that interval. From the remainder, let us now show that x(L) = 3μ−1
4μ +
1−μ
μ |y (L)− ym| is a dominant strategy.
Again case we have to consider two cases:
1. Suppose that x(R) > 3μ−1
4μ −
1−μ2
μ |y (L)− ym| . In that case, the number
of citizens who vote for the incumbent are given by min {1, xi}− exi.We
need to consider two subcases depending on the value of the extremes
of this interval.
i. If xi > 1 then R gets 1− exi votes and wins the election if and only if
exi < 1
2
→ x (R) < 3− μ
4
Since xi > 1 if and only if x (R) > 3−μ4 then this case cannot arise.
ii. If xi < 1 then R gets xi − exi votes. This number of votes is greater
than 1
2
if and only if x (R) > 3−μ
4
. Since xi < 1 if and only if
x (R) < 3−μ
4
again this case is not possible.
2. Suppose instead that x(R) < 3μ−1
4μ −
1−μ2
μ |y (L)− ym| .This means nec-
essarily that xi < 1 and that the challenger collects votes in (max{0, xi}, xi).
We need to consider then two diﬀerent subcases:
i. If xi < 0 the challenger gets xi votes and wins if and only if x (R) ≥
1+μ
4
. But this leads to a contradiction because
1 + μ
4
>
3μ− 1
4μ
−1− μ
2
μ
|y (L)− ym| ⇔ 1− μ
4(1 + μ)
> − |y (L)− ym| .
ii. If xi > 0 then R gets xi − xi = 2 |y (L)− ym| votes. So here R
cannot win either.
Thus R cannot win the election for any x(R) he may choose. Still, observe
that x(R) = 3−μ
4
is a dominant strategy for her.
Since we have shown that L wins in equilibrium when |y (L)− ym| ≤ 14 ,
we have that L’s most preferred best response is an equilibrium strategy.
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Proof of Proposition 5. First, suppose that |y (L)− ym| > 1/2. If
x(L) > x(R) in equilibrium, consider x0(R) such that x0(R) = x(L) and
notice that: 1) in this case R obtains more than |y (L)− ym| votes, that is,
more than half of the total; and 2) the equilibrium policy outcome is larger,
therefore better oﬀ for R’. Thus this is a profitable deviation for R and it
implies that x(L) > x(R) cannot hold in equilibrium.
Since we know that in equilibrium x(L) ≤ x(R) R’s best winning strategy
is defined by xi > 1 and exi < 12 .This implies that
xi =
x (R)− μx (L)
1− μ + |y (L)− ym| > 1
and exi = x (R) + μx (L)
1 + μ
− 1− μ
1 + μ
|y (L)− ym| < 1
2
Thus the set of winnings strategies for R is defined by
(1− μ) (1− |y (L)− ym|)+μx (L) < x (R) < 1 + μ
2
+(1− μ) |y (L)− ym|−μx (L)
and among themR prefers the largest one x (R) = 1+μ
2
+(1− μ) |y (L)− ym|−
μx (L) .
The best response for L in this case is the largest possible value of x (L) .
So that R’s best response to it corresponds to its smallest possible value.
Since in equilibrium we need to have x(L) ≤ x(R) then x(L) ≤ 1+μ
2
+
(1− μ) |y (L)− ym| − μx (L) implies x(L) ≤ 12 + 1−μ1+μ |y (L)− ym| . Thus in
equilibrium x (L) = x(R) = 1
2
+ 1−μ
1+μ |y (L)− ym| .
Now suppose that 1/4 < |y (L)− ym| < 1/2. If x(L) ∈
£
0, 1
2
+ |y (L)− ym|
¤
then R’s best response, as in the previous proposition, is defined by xi > 1
and exi < 12 .
This implies that
xi =
x (R)− μx (L)
1− μ + |y (L)− ym| > 1
and exi = x (R) + μx (L)
1 + μ
− 1− μ
1 + μ
|y (L)− ym| < 1
2
Thus the set of winnings strategies for R is defined by (1− μ) (1− |y (L)− ym|)+
μx (L) < x (R) < 1+μ
2
+ (1− μ) |y (L)− ym|− μx (L)
and among them R prefers x (R) = 1+μ
2
+ (1− μ) |y (L)− ym|− μx (L)
And the best response for L in this case is the largest possible value of
x (L) . Since in equilibrium we need to have x(L) ≤ x(R) then x(L) ≤ 1+μ
2
+
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(1− μ) |y (L)− ym| − μx (L) implies x(L) ≤ 12 + 1−μ1+μ |y (L)− ym| . Thus for
x(L) ∈
£
0, 1
2
+ |y (L)− ym|
¤
R’s best response is x(R) = 1
2
+ 1−μ
1+μ |y (L)− ym| .
Given that if x(L) ∈
£
1
2
+ |y (L)− ym| , 1
¤
we have that R’s best response
is x(R) ∈
£
1
2
+ |y (L)− ym| , 1
¤
, and for x(L) ∈
£
0, 1
2
− |y (L)− ym|
¢
we have
that R’s best response is x(R) = 1
2
+ 1−μ
1+μ |y (L)− ym| < 12+ |y (L)− ym| , this
implies that L’s optimal strategy will not be in
£
1
2
+ |y (L)− ym| , 1
¤
.
Therefore the equilibrium if 1
4
< |y (L)− ym| < 12 is given by x(L) =
x(R) = 1
2
+ 1−μ
1+μ |y (L)− ym| .
Proof of Proposition 6. Let us start with the case when |y (L)− ym| ≤
1−3μ
4(1−μ) .Notice that it can emerge if and only if μ ≤
1
3
. In that case the in-
cumbent’s payoﬀ is increasing with |y (L)− ym| so his most preferred value
of y (L) in this range corresponds to y (L) = ym − 1−3μ4(1−μ) . We already know
from previous results that in this case that he will then set x∗(L) = 0
When 1−3μ
4(1−μ) ≤ |y (L)− ym| ≤ 14 , after plugging the incumbent’s equi-
librium platforms in the electoral issue, it is possible to rewrite his payoﬀ
as
VL = −ym +K −
3μ− 1
4μ
− 1− 2μ
μ
|y (L)− ym| , (2)
which is decreasing with |y (L)− ym| as long as μ ≤ 12 and increasing other-
wise. In the former case, L’s most preferred value of y (L) corresponds to the
minimal value of |y (L)− ym| in this range, that is, y (L) = max
n
ym − 1−3μ4(1−μ) , ym
o
.
Hence, if μ ≤ 1
3
he will set again y (L) = ym − 1−3μ4(1−μ) (and then x∗(L) = 0)
whereas if 1
3
≤ μ ≤ 1
2
he must set y (L) = ym which in turn implies that
x∗(L) = 3μ−1
4μ .
The third case occurs when μ ≥ 1
2
. Then (2) is increasing with |y (L)− ym| .
Thus while staying in this range his most preferred value of y (L) corresponds
to the one that maximizes |y (L)− ym|, that is, y (L) = ym − 14 , that from
previous results it implies x∗(L) = 1
2
.
Proof of Proposition 7. We know from previous results that if the
incumbent decides to lose by setting |y (L)− ym| > 14 , the challenger will win
the election and set x(R) = 1
2
+ 1−μ
1+μ |y (L)− ym| . In that case, the incumbent
receives the payoﬀ
VL = −ym −
1
2
− 2μ
1 + μ
|y (L)− ym| ,
which is increasing in |y (L)− ym| . Thus while staying in this range, his most
preferred value of y (L) corresponds to the one that maximizes |y (L)− ym|,
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that is, y∗ (L) = 0, which implies that the challenger’s best response in this
case is x∗(R) = 1
2
+ 1−μ
1+μym.
Proof of Proposition 8. Previous results show that since ym < 14
implies that |y (L)− ym| < 14 then L prefers to win in this case.
If ym ≥ 14 , if the incumbent decides to lose then he receives a payoﬀ equal
to
VL = −
1
2
− 1− μ
1 + μ
ym.
If the incumbent decides to use his best winnings strategy then he receives
a payoﬀ equal to
when μ ≤ 1
3
his payoﬀ boils down to
VL = −ym +K −
3μ− 1
4(1− μ) if μ ≤
1
2
(3)
and
VL = −ym +K −
1
4
if μ ≥ 1
2
(4)
Thus, when μ ≥ 1
2
he prefers to use his winning strategy as long as
−ym +K − 14 ≥ −
1
2
− 1−μ
1+μym, that is, for
K >
2μ
1 + μ
ym −
1
4
Notice that this value is strictly positive for all values of μ ∈ [0, 1] as long
as ym > 38 . For
1
4
≤ ym ≤ 38 we will have that the incumbent will decide to
use a winning strategy for all values of K whenever 2μ
1+μym −
1
4
> 0, that
is, μ > 1
8ym−1 . Notice that the incumbent decides to win for all K whenever
ym = 14 . Furthermore, the incumbent always decides to forgo reelection for
some positive values of K whenever ym > 38 .
Similarly, when μ ≤ 1
2
he prefers to use his winning strategy as long as
−ym +K − 3μ−14(1−μ) ≥ −
1
2
− 1−μ
1+μym, that is, for
K >
5μ− 3
4(1− μ) +
2μ
1 + μ
ym,
Notice that this value is strictly negative for small values of μ (in particu-
lar for all μ ≤ 1
3
). For those values the incumbent decides to win the election
for all K. The set of values of K for which the incumbent decides to use a
winning strategy is smaller for larger values of μ in this area.
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Figure 1: Incumbent’s best winning strategies. 
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Figure 2 : Minimal values of K for which the incumbent prefers to use a winning 
strategy in equilibrium. 
